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William Connolly (1998: 120) has suggested that: 
 
Foucault does not articulate a vision of democracy. His early objections against 
political ideals such as prisons militates against it; and his later cautious 
affirmation of a positive political imagination never takes this form. But 
numerous comments in the context of his participation in public protests and 
demonstrations are suggestive on this score. It seems to me that a series of 
correspondences can be delineated between the ethical sensibility cultivated by 
Foucault and an ethos of democracy they invoke. 
 
 
It is in this spirit of the ethos of democracy invoked by Foucault that my article takes 
root. Like Connolly, I will supplement Foucault with ideas and thoughts that extend 
beyond him, until I create a picture coherent enough to satisfy. I will of course 
differentiate Foucault’s thought from the extensions and supplementations I provide. 
To the extent that Foucault advanced no overarching theory of democracy, the 
questions become, which of his ideas and formulations are relevant for a theory of 
democracy, how might he have problematised existing conceptions and formulations, 
and what lines of argument might he suggest for future explorations. My approach is 
premised on the fact that while Foucault showed little interest in, and indeed some 
distaste for, normative political theorising, I have no such inhibitions. My tactic is to 
piece together the fragments of a theory of democracy, to show how Foucault 
approaches democracy as a set of historically contingent practices, and to reveal the 
latent normative conceptions and suggestions within his texts. My argument, or 
conclusion, will be that Foucault suggests a theory of democracy and suggests a series 
of conceptions of democracy that takes us beyond our current models and practices. I 
endeavour to outline what such a conception might look like. The basis for such an 
argument stems from Foucault’s later writings on ethics and self-creation, liberty, 
autonomy and rights. More specifically, I will consider the following areas of his 
thought. 
 
• a relational and dialogical conception of ethics with implications for agency, 
liberty, autonomy and interdependence; 
• a conception of liberty as nondonmination or as involving an equalization of 
power relations; 
• insights derived from his writings on power and resistence; 
• a critique of philosophical and political monism 
• a pragmatic political principle that would necessarily oppose government policies 
that conflict with or inhibit the cultivation of the self. 
• An advocacy of parrhesia or speaking the truth to power. 
• His writings on human rights 
 
 
Liberty and ethics and domination 
 
Foucault’s conceptions of liberty and ethics can be seen to presuppose a democratic 
context. Although historically, democracy has been associated, as Weber argued, with 
an expanding hierarchical bureaucracy and as a form of technical expertise as ends in 
themselves, Foucault would see these tendencies as contingent historical episodes and 
challenges to be surmounted rather than as the necessary consequences of the 
expansion of the democracy process.  
 
 
Several normative themes related to democracy are presupposed by Foucault’s 
conceptions of liberty, ethics and more broadly in relation to his writings on the 
cultivation and constitution of the self. In his later two volumes of The History of 
Sexuality, and in a variety of articles and interviews, Foucault develops a conception 
of the self which while avoiding liberal humanist conception of the autonomous 
chooser, incorporates a sense of agency and freedom. In this new found concern with 
an active subject, there is on the surface a shift in relation to Foucault’s interest away 
from knowledge as a coercive practice of subjection to being a practice of the self-
formation of the subject. Yet this positing of a more active, volitional subject does not 
involve a radical break with his earlier work, nor is it inconsistent with it. In Madness 
and Civilization, Foucault (1989q: 296) states that it was a matter of knowing how 
one ‘governed’ ‘the mad’; in his later two works, it is a matter of how one ‘governs’ 
‘oneself’. In addition, he says (1991a: 11): 
 
If now I am interested…in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an 
active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not 
something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds 
in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his 
culture, his society and his social group. 
 
Cultivating the self is the basis of ethical work.  Ethical work, says Foucault, is the 
work one performs in the attempt to transform oneself into an ethical subject of one’s 
own behaviour, the means by which we change ourselves in order to become ethical 
subjects. Such a history of ethics is a history of aesthetics. In his interview ‘On the 
Genealogy of Ethics’, Foucault (1983d: 237-8) explains that there is: 
 
Another side to these moral prescriptions which most of the time is not 
isolated as such but is, I think, very important: the kind of relationship you 
ought to have with yourself, rapport á soi, which I call ethics, and which 
determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral 
subject of his own actions. 
 
Ethics, as such, is part of morality, but rather focus exclusively on codes of moral 
behaviour, it concentrates on the self’s relationship to the self, for the way we relate to 
ourselves contributes to the way that we construct ourselves and form our identities, 
as well as the way we lead our lives and govern our conduct. 
 
Foucault’s understanding of ethics and liberty invokes a particular form of 
community. Hence, Foucault’s conception of ethics is not the narrow individualist 
conception of western modernity. Rather it refers to what Kant termed Sitten – 
customs or practices. Hence, ethics for Foucault is not intended in the Kantian sense, 
as Ian Hacking (1986: 239) puts it, as “something utterly internal, the private duty of 
reason”, but more in the sense of Ancient Greece where ethics was concerned with the 
good life. As Foucault states it: 
 
The Greeks . . . considered this freedom as a problem and the freedom 
of the individual as an ethical problem. But ethical in the sense that 
Greeks could understand. Ethos was the deportment and the way to 
behave. It was the subject's mode of being and a certain manner of 
acting visible to others. One's ethos was seen by his dress, by his 
bearing, by his gait, by the poise with which he reacts to events, etc. 
For them that is the complete expression of liberty.  
 
That ethics necessitates a certain form of democracy is indirectly supported by two 
concepts Foucault introduces : philosophia and stylization. Influenced by Hadot, 
Foucault utilised the concept of philosophia as a form of life, which required 
exercises aimed at realising one’s vision of the world and one’s conduct within it. As 
Arnold Davidson (1994: 70-71) notes, “the idea of philosophy as a way of life…is one 
of the most forceful and provocative directions of Foucault’s later thought”. To 
emphasise philosophy as a “way of life” must be seen as distinct, says Davidson 
(1994: 70-71), from everyday life, for as Hadot wrote in respect to the ancients, the 
idea of a way of life “implies a rupture with what the sceptics called bios, that is daily 
life”. For Foucault, “philosophy was a spiritual exercise… in order to learn to think 
differently”. 
 
Closely related to philosophia, ethical action demand stylization, which is an 
aesthetics of existence. In this sense, ethical self-creation of one's life as a work of art 
extends Nietzsche's conception that life has value as an aesthetic achievement and that 
one must give style to one's life by integrating the diffuse nature of oneself into a 
coherent whole. The question of style was crucial in ancient experience: there is the 
stylization of one's relationship to oneself, the style of conduct, and the stylization of 
one's relationship to others. In the Greco-Roman Empire of the second and third 
centuries, style became thought of as a moral code (Foucault, 1989: 319). According 
to Davidson (1997: 70-71), this theme of aesthetics as involving a style of existence is 
another of Foucault's central ideas in his later writings.i ‘Styles of existence’ refers to 
how one lives a life philosophically. The problem of ethics is in choosing a style of 
life. As Paul Veyne (cited in Davidson, 1997: 67) notes, ‘style does not mean 
distinction here; the word is to be taken in the sense of the Greeks, for whom artist 
was first of all an artisan, and a work of art was first of all a work.’ As Davidson 
notes, one of Foucault's concerns was in the style of life of the homosexual 
community by which he sought to ‘advance . . . a homosexual askesis that would 
make us work on ourselves and invent, I do not say discover, a manner of being that is 
still improbable’ (Foucault, cited in Davidson, 1997: 72). Hence, as Davidson points 
out (1997: 72), the homosexual style of life involves new forms of friendship and 
yields ‘a culture and an ethics aimed at the creation of a homo-sexual mode of life’. 
 
Government is important for Foucault, as Mitchell Dean (1999: 184) says, “according 
to whether it allows rather than inhibits the ‘self-directed use and development of 
capacities”. Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self involves a politically 
active subject acting in a community of subjects, involving practices of the self that 
involve governance as well as the problems of practical politics. Foucault speaks for 
instance of liberty as involving complex relations to others and self.  Ethical action is 
not for Foucault an individual affair but presupposes a certain political and social 
structure with respect to liberty. For liberty or civic freedom to exist, there must be a 
certain level of liberation conceived as the absence of domination. Thus the subject's 
activity is intrinsically mediated through power which co-exists with freedom in that 
relationships of power are changeable relations which can modify themselves. But 
where states of domination result in relations of power being fixed ‘in such a way that 
they are perpetually asymmetrical [then the] margin of liberty is extremely limited’ 
(1991:12). Foucault (1991: 12) gives the example of the traditional conjugal relation 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:  
 
We cannot say that there was only male power; the woman herself could 
do a lot of things: be unfaithful to him, extract money from him, refuse 
him sexually. She was, however, subject to a state of domination, in the 
measure where all that was finally no more than a certain number of tricks 
which never brought about a reversal of the situation.  
 
Invoking democracy, the normative inference is the counterfactual: resistance should 
oppose domination where ever it finds it. Such an inference suggests that domination 
is an inbalance of power, it is one of many structurings of power, and what resistance 
aims at is an ‘equalisation’; and rather than a concentration, it suggests a dispersment. 
The emphasis on ‘minimising domination’ appears again in his remarks on Habermas. 
Criticising Habermas for advocating a form of ‘utopian’ thinking, whereby 
communicative action  operates in a powerless vacuum, Foucault (1991: 18) says: 
 
I don’t believe there can be a society without relations of power…. The problem 
is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of perfectly transparent 
communication, but to give oneself the rules of law, the techniques of 
management, but also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would 
allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination. 
 
In this sense, says Foucault (1991: 6): 
 
 Liberty is itself political. And then it has a political model, in the measure 
where being free means not being a slave to one’s self and to one’s appetites, 
which presupposes that one establish over one’s self a certain relation of 
domination, of mastery, which was called arche – power, authority. 
 
When one practices liberty one is engaged in moral conduct, which is to say that 
liberty must be practiced ethically. As Foucault (1991: 4) puts it: “Liberty is the 
ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the deliberate form assumed by liberty”. 
This means that the ‘care for the self’ involves liberty and ethics, which presumes a 
certain form of social structure: a certain degree of liberation.  
 
Ethical action also takes place in a community, in that care for the self involves care 
for others. In Foucault’s (1991: 7) words: 
 
The care for the self always aims at the good for others…This implies also a 
relation with others to the extent that care for self renders one competent to 
occupy a place in the city, in the community or in interindividual 
relationships…I think the assumption of all this morality was that one who 
cared for himself correctly found himself, by that very fact, in a measure to 
behave correctly in relationship to others and for others. A city in which 
everyone would be correctly concerned for self would be a city that would be 
doing well, and it would find therein the ethical principle of its stability. 
 
Such a community is both borderless and complexly differentiated. These are the two 
essential conditions of what I have called elsewhere (Olssen, 2002) a ‘thin 
community’. In such a conception difference and unity are balanced. To use concepts 
developed by John Rawls, all that is required is a modus vivendi – a loose alliance, 
treaty, or settlement, although such communities may seek to work towards an 
overlapping consensus.  Thin communities are linked to other communities and to the 
global order. The kings head may not be cut off, but the king is certainly under greater 
surveillance. In political terms, says Foucault (1994: 474): 
 
There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its duties and 
that obliges one to speak out against every abuse of power, whoever its 
author, whoever its victims. After all, we are all members of the community 
of the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity. 
 
Democratic tactics comprise a multifaceted range of mechanisms and processes. Its 
advantage for a Foucauldian politics is not simply that it enables the participation and 
approval of concerns by the entire collectivity and of all the major groups within it, 
but more importantly, it permits continued debate, modification, rejection, or revision 
of agreed decisions while enabling a maximum of freedom and autonomy, an ongoing 
possibility of negotiation and dialogue, and the most effective opposition possible to 
abuses of power. 
 
Rights as a historic-political discourse 
 
I want now to look at three practices of democracy, or better tactics or strategies that 
can be called democratic: rights; contestation; and deliberation.  A genealogy of 
democracy would trace the historical descent and emergence of the multiple 
processes, strategies, mechanisms, and tactics that society’s instantiate as discourses 
of protection against war and conquest. At the same time, it would trace the shifting 
historically contingent conceptions of what constituted democracy in different 
societies at different times. Rather than government ‘by the people’ in any direct or 
unmediated sense of ‘pure’ democracy1, as in eighteenth century Europe and North 
America, as well as Greek society, or in the later ‘representative’ conceptions, 
Foucault would see practices of democracy more broadly as representing “historico-
political” discourses, comprising tactics, strategies and mechanisms. What are such 
tactics strategies and mechanisms aimed at? They are aimed at, and justified in 
relation to, the prevention of war.  
 
In Foucault’s (2003: 131-3) view the discourse of rights is a ‘historico-political 
discourse’ aimed at the protection of lives. As he puts it (2003: 241): 
                                                          
1 Term used by Tom Paine. See Hindess 2000:34; Paine 1989:170 
The jurists of the seventeenth century and especially the eighteenth century 
were, you see, already asking this question about the right of life and death. The 
jurists ask: when we enter into a contract, what are individuals doing at the level 
of the social contract, when they come together to constitute a sovereign, to 
delegate absolute power over them to a sovereign? They do so because they are 
forced to by some threat or by need. They therefore do so in order to protect 
their lives. 
 
Thus, viewing the development of rights in relation to “mechanisms, techniques and 
technologies of power’ (p. 241) they assumed prominence because (p. 241): 
 
In the seventieth and eighteenth centuries we saw the emergence of techniques 
of power that were essentially centered on the body. 
 
In this, rights were a device, part of the: 
 
Devices that were used to ensure spatial distribution of individual bodies (their 
separation, their alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the 
organization around those individuals of a whole field of visibility. They were 
also techniques that would be used to take control over bodies. 
 
Rights are part of the ‘individualizing-totalizing’ disciplinary technology. They were 
juridical technologies charged with protecting the pluribus while promoting the unum. 
Although rights constituted individualising technologies of power, a new form 
emerged at the end of the eighteenth century which also applied to rights in that it 
enabled individuals to be monitored, counted, compared, processed, treated equitably.  
 
This technology of power does not exclude the former, does not exclude 
disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to 
some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in 
existing disciplinary technologies…So after a first seizure of power over the 
body in an individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of power that is not 
individualizing, but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-
body, but man-as-species…What I would call a “biopolitics” of the human 
race. 
 
Hobbes is in this sense the father of rights, for he saw the issue was security. As 
Foucault notes: (2003: 98): 
 
Leviathan’s strategic opposite number is, I think, the political use that was being 
made in political struggles of a certain historical knowledge pertaining to wars, 
invasions, pillage, dispossessions, confiscations, robbery, exaction, and the 
effects of all that, the effects of all these acts of war, all these feats of battle, and 
the real struggles that go on in the laws and institutions that apparently regulate 
power….Leviathan’s invisible adversary is the Conquest. 
 
Rights crystallize whatever given inbalance of power and wealth exists. A system of 
rights is part of a settlement. A settlement can be represented, in Rawls’s sense, as a 
modus vivendi, which is to say, a treaty, or alliance of diverse interests, which may at 
times constitute an overlapping consensus. In situations of war the settlement 
collapses and rights mean nothing. In this sense, the concept of settlement, although 
not explicitly used by Foucault, is useful in that it attests to the historical character of 
rights. Rights are a strategy; a war-preventing strategy. They constitute a system of 
universal regulation of what is due whom and what is owed. 
 
In this sense, what is to be made of H. L. A. Hart’s claim that rights are natural?  And, 
if there are no natural rights, is the discourse of rights redundant?  What Hart failed to 
see is that moral rights may be built on a historically constituted settlement, and they 
will reflect the injustices and iniquities built into that settlement. In this sense, the 
existence of moral rights does not mean there must exist a natural right of liberty 
amongst men. Rights systems take effect as a settlement against war. They are a 
technology a fixing the relation of the individual to the society; they differentiate; they 
are one of the ‘dividing practices’. Foucault (2003: 156) cites Boulainvilliers who 
argues that the idea of a natural right is “no more than a useless abstraction”. In 
Boulainvilliers view you can study history for as long as you like but you will never 
discover any natural rights. Behind the existing divisions between groups or strata in 
society are wars and struggles. Freedom, specifically, is not natural, for freedom is 
only conceivable if there are no relationships of domination between the individuals 
concerned. Freedom for Boulainvilliers is essentially the freedom to trample on the 
freedom of others. In this sense, freedom is the direct opposite of equality. Whatever 
the relation between the two, it is something that is decided and enjoyed according to 
“difference, domination, and war, thanks to a whole system of relations of force” (p. 
157). In these relations, any laws of nature, if indeed they do exist, are weaker than 
the “nonegalitarian law of history”: 
 
It is therefore natural that the egalitarian law of nature should have given way – 
on a permanent basis – to the nonegalitarian law of history. It was because it 
was primal that natural right was not, as the jurists claim, foundational; it was 
foreclosed by the greater vigor of history. The law of history is always stronger 
than the law of nature. This is what Boulainvilliers is arguing when he says that 
history finally created a natural law that made freedom and equality antithetical, 
and that this natural law is stronger than the law inscribed in what is known as 
natural right. The fact that history is stronger than nature explains, ultimately 
why history has completely concealed nature. When history begins, nature can 
no longer speak, because in the war between history and nature, history always 
has the upper hand. There is a relationship of force between nature and history, 
and it is definitely in history’s favor. So natural right does not exist, or exists 
only insofar as it has been defeated: it is always history’s great loser, it is “the 
other” 
 
A further point Boulainvilliers suggests is that “war is both the starting point for an 
analysis of society and the deciding factor in social organisation” (Foucault, 2003: 
158). What is meant her is that wars and struggles determine the particular form of the 
relation of force between freedom and equality in the settlements or agreements that 
separate wars and contain struggles. The nature of military institutions, or the problem 
of “who has the weapons” is crucial to the maintenance of order between wars. The 
“problem of who has the weapons” is bound up, says Foucault (2003: 159) “with 
certain technical problems, and it is in this sense that it can provide the starting point 
for a general analysis of society”. He continues (p. 161): 
 
History now looks essentially like a calculation of forces…Once the strong 
become weak and the weak become strong, there will  be new oppositions, new 
divisions, and a new distribution of forces: the weak will form alliances among 
themselves, and the strong will try to form alliances with some and against 
others….For his part Boulainvilliers makes the relationship of war part of every 
social relationship, subdivides it into a thousand different channels, and reveals 
war to be a sort of permanent state that exists between groups, fronts and 
tactical units as they in some sense civilize one another, come into conflict with 
one another, or on the contrary, form alliances. There is no more multiple and 
stable great masses, but there is a multiple war. In one sense, it is a war of every 
man against every man, but it is obviously no a war of every man against every 
man in the abstract and – I think – unreal sense in which Hobbes spoke of the 
war of every man when he tried to demonstrate that it is not the war of every 
man against every man that is at work in the social body. With Boulainvilliers, 
in contrast, we have a generalised war that permeates the entire social body and 
the entire history of the social body; it is obviously not the sort of war in which 
individuals fight individuals, but one in which groups fight groups. 
 
The upshot of this conception is that war is a “disruption of right” (p. 163). Here, says 
Foucault:  
 
War turns the very disruption of right into a grid of intelligibility, and makes it 
possible to determine the force relationship that always underpins a certain 
relationship of right. Boulainvilliers can thus integrate events such as wars, 
invasions, and change – which were once seen as simply naked acts of violence 
– into a whole layer of contents and prophecies that covered society in its 
entirety….A history that takes as its starting point the fact of war itself and 
makes its analysis in terms of war can relate all these things – war, religion, 
politics, manners, and characters – and can therefor act as a principle that allows 
us to understand history.  
 
The point of citing and summarizing Foucault in his account of Boulainvilliers here is 
because it brings to the fore the functions of democratic practices and tactics – not 
simply rights, but also the others – contestation, deliberation, the rule of law, the 
franchise, elections, representation – as part of the settlement against war and chaos. 
In this sense, rights may recognise, preserve and legitimate the existing unequal 
relation of forces in society, as they did in the seventeenth century, in consolidating 
bourgeois relations of property and class. Or they may, in other periods, conceivably 
extend from the political to the economic domains, seeking to challenge unequal 
relations and forces. In this sense, rights to life, to a certain minimum level of 
sustenance and property, to walk the streets in day or night, to speak, to contest, can 
be endorsed, exchanged, surrendered, or exempted. What is clear, however, is that for 
Foucault, democracy is the alternative to war, for democracy is nothing but the tactics 
adopted to resolve conflict, ensure more or less peaceful transitions of power, and to 
permit each individual their legitimate arena or space, whereby rights – both passive 
and active – can be exercised and maintained. In this sense, democracy is the 
containment and management of war.  Democracy is politics, and as Foucault (2003: 
15) says, inverting Clausewitz’s aphorism, “politics is the continuation of war by 
other means”.  
 
 
Contestation and deliberation 
 
Foucault’s writing on rights, as summarised above, from his lecture of the 11th 
February 1976 at the College de France show his serious consideration in relation to 
the themes of war and peace, and security. Such considerations also give substance to 
his political work on behalf of prisoners and other marginalised groups. In June 1984, 
Libération carried his brief article Confronting Governments: Human Rights, where 
Foucault states: 
 
There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its duties and 
that obliges one to speak out against every abuse of power, whoever its 
author, whoever its victims. After all, we are all members of the community 
of the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity. 
 
The conception of rights here invoked seems to be one beyond both sovereignty 
and discipline; one which Foucault (1980: 108) hinted at towards the close of the 
Second Lecture on Power of 14th January 1976. Here he says: 
 
If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to 
struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the 
ancient right of sovereignty that we should turn, but towards the possibility 
of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at 
the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty. 
 
A conception of right not subject to normalisation, and not legitimating the interests 
of the monarch might exist in contestation which is entailed in Foucault’s discussions 
of resistance to power, which occurs wherever domination occurs, as well as in 
relation to his later discussion of parrhesia, which has a range of meanings and uses, 
one of which functions in relation to democratic institutions, and means essentially 
speaking the truth to power. For Foucault (2001: 11) points to an ancient tradition 
revolving around free speech, as embodied in  parrhesia, which he defines as 
“frankness in speaking the truth”. Ordinarily translated into English as ‘free speech’, 
parrhesiazomai or parrhesiazesthai is to use parrhesia, and the parrhesastes is the 
one who uses parrhesia, i.e., the one who speaks the truth. But someone is said to use 
parrhesia “only if there is a risk or danger for him in telling the truth…the 
parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk” (2001d: 16).  In addition: 
 
The function of parrhesia…has the function of criticism…. Parrhesia is a 
form of criticism, either towards another or towards oneself, but always in 
a situation where the  speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority 
with respect to the interlocutor. The parrhesiastes is always less powerful 
than the one with whom he speaks. 
 
Finally, “in parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty. ”.  Foucault (2001d: 19-
20) draws the various elements together thus: 
 
Parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific 
relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life 
through danger, a certain type of relationship to himself or other people 
through criticism…and a specific relation to moral law through freedom 
and duty.  More precisely, parrhesia is verbal activity in which a speaker 
expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he 
recognizes truth telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well 
as himself).  In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses 
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the 
risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and 
moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.  That, then, quite 
generally, is the positive meaning of the word parrhesia in most of the 
Greek texts…from the Fifth Century B.C. to the Fifth Century A.D. 
 
In relation to Greek uses, parrhesia was potentially seen as dangerous to democracy. 
As Foucault (2001: 77) explains: 
 
The problem, very roughly put was the following. Democracy is founded on 
politeia, a constitution, where the demos, the people, exercise power, and where 
everyone is equal in front of the law. Such a constitution, however, is 
condemned to give equal place to all forms of parrhesia, even the worst. 
Because parrhesia is given even to the worst citizens, the overwhelming 
influence of bad, immoral, or ignorant speakers may lead the citizenry into 
tyranny, or may otherwise endanger the city. Hence parrhesia may be 
dangerous to democracy itself. 
 
Thus, in the third book of Plato’s Republic [Book VIII, 557a-b], Socrates tells 
Adeimantus that: 
 
When the poor win the result is democracy. They kill some of the opposite 
party, banish others, and grant the rest an equal share in civil rights and 
government, officials being usually appointed by lot. 
 
Socrates goes on to enquire as to what people are like in a democracy: 
 
First of all, they are free. Liberty and free speech [parrhesia] are rife 
everywhere; anyone is allowed to do what he likes….That being so, every man 
will arrange his own manner of life to suit his pleasure. 
 
Plato’s concern here, says Foucault (2001: 84) is that in a democracy there is: 
 
no common logos, no possible unity, for the city. Following the Platonic 
principle that there is an analogous relation between the way a human being 
behaves and the way the city is ruled, between the hierarchical organization of 
the faculties of the human being and the constitution makeup of the polis, you 
can see very well that if everyone in the city behaves just as he wishes, with 
each person following his own opinion, his own will or desires, then there are in 
the city as many constitutions, as many small autonomous cities, as there are 
citizens doing whatever they please. And you can see that Plato also considers 
parrhesia not only as the freedom to say whatever one wishes, but as linked 
with the freedom to do whatever one wants. It is a kind of anarchy involving the 
freedom to choose one’s own style of life without limit. 
 
Plato’s concern occludes difference, or fails to allow for difference within unity. 
Parrhesia is not condemned because all citizens are given rights to influence the city, 
or to have a say. Yet, within the context of security and war, this democratic right, 
parrhesia becomes the condition on which peace is maintained. Parrhesia contributes 
to the democratic settlement against war that constantly threatens to erupt, or become 
uncontainable. Such insights are potentially continuous with the republican tradition, 
where rights of contestation are prior to consent and where public decisions are 
legitimate so long as they are capable of withstanding group and individual 
contestation under procedures agreed by all. In this sense, contestation is a hedge 
against arbitrariness in decision making. Essentially, contestation introduces the 
fundamental idea of democracy as self-rule. 
 
If parrhesia could contribute to an ideal of democracy within the law, according to the 
constitutional rules that limit its scope, in talking about moving beyond sovereignty 
and discipline, Foucault seems to acknowledge a more fundamental right to resistance 
when power becomes damned up, resulting in domination. Thus in his interview     
‘Truth and Power’ he (1980: 122) speaks of resistance in strategical terms when 
surveillance and oppression become “unbearable”. In this sense, it could constitute a 
right in the sense, not that it relates back to nature, but in that it becomes the condition 
on which war and chaos are avoided. While such strategies don’t guarantee the 
avoidance of war, they become its best hope, and its minimum condition. Let us say, 
without such a right, war, which is really the suspension of all rights, all security, 
becomes almost certain. Resistance – short of war – becomes a condition of pluralist 
democracy, which is itself a strategy for the avoidance of war.  
 
Strategies of contestation are linked to deliberation, which requires the fostering of 
institutions in which political action, with all its limitations, can be pursued. 
Deliberative democracy acknowledges that viewpoints and preferences will conflict, 
and allows for uncoerced or open context as essential to the arrival at an agreed 
outcome. Such strategies for Foucault are essentially group based where the views of 
individuals are transformed in the process. Deliberative democracy thus counts to 
insure against open conflict. 
 
In the Foucauldian sense, deliberation recognises and tolerates differences to a much 
greater sense than in Habermas’s understanding. Habermas’s post-Kantian conception 
of a transcendent communicative consensus, embodied through the ideal speech 
situation is replaced by a much looser context of shared agreements, more of the 
character of Rawls’s modus vivendi than a consensus reached based on 
epistemological grounds of the force of the better argument alone. A modus vivendi is 
simply is loose treaty or agreement based sometimes only on the minimum rules of 
the game. The aim of deliberation is not epistemic consensus but rather, a new 
concord or settlement based on a workable balance between different views, a 
pragmatic consensus of sorts, based on epistemic factors, conceptions of justice, as 
well as a range of pragmatic factors such as the priorities for peace and stability at a 
particular moment in time. 
 
Foucault and democracy post 9/11. 
 
If a settlement is a historically contingent accord or agreement which constitutes a 
system of rules whose function is the containment of conflict and prevention of open 
hostilities, in the Hobbesian sense, it is motivated by the quest for security. Foucault 
clearly accepts such a view, but whether he would accept Hobbes skepticism in 
international relations is more doubtful. The standard view of international relations 
accords with the Westphalian model of free independent states, organised and run on 
the basis of autonomy and non-interference. Such a view represents an extrapolation 
from Hobbes views about individuals in the state of nature to ethical skepticism 
concerning relations between states in the international arena. For Hobbes there were 
no effective moral principles in the state of nature. The fact that one individual cannot 
trust another individual to abide by a moral rule or norm, makes it pointless acting in 
such a way oneself - which is why life in the state of nature is ‘solitary, nasty, brutish 
and short’.  In the international system of states, ethical skepticism means that there 
are no moral restrictions on a state’s interpretation of its own interests.  Hence, as 
moral rules would be inappropriate, the system is seen as ‘anarchic’.  
 
Kant rejected such a conception, as did Grotius and Pufendorf before him.  Rather 
than support an anarchic conception of international relations based on individual 
state interests, they supported an ethical view of the role of the state acting in accord 
with an objective moral ruleii.  Initial plausibility of such a view can be seen in the 
existence of human rights accords, international charters, and initiatives towards 
international peace, which would seem to suggest that some conception of 
international morality does exist, and does influence states in their actions towards 
each other.  Before the Peace of Westphalia, Grotius had defined international 
relations as a moral community of statesiii.  Pufendorf also developed a conception of 
the ‘morality of states’, interpreting international relations from within a natural law 
traditioniv. 
 
Globalisation, terrorism and WMD make such a model, based on an ‘ethical’ 
conception of the global order, more of a necessity than a plausible option in the 
twenty first century. The rise of international terrorism and WMD, as well as 
phenomenon like climate change, SARS and AIDS alters the ‘equation’, for they 
make individual and collective survival an important ethical concern.  The 
possibilities of nuclear terrorism, together with the democratisation of knowledge, and 
of access to nuclear knowledge and technology, makes the challenges facing 
humanity formidable.  In this situation, survival constitutes a new imperative, a ‘final 
settlement’, to justify a global law of morality amongst nations.  Acting according to 
principles becomes compelling if by so doing acts of terrorism are minimised, and the 
possibilities for survival are enhanced.  Similarly, the possibility of AOT or of 
violence, or unintended developments like climate change, AIDS or SARS, increases 
the need for a discourse of safety and security.  We may not agree with Hobbes on 
very much, but the priority of security over freedom, was indeed a profound insight.  
Globalisation and terrorism raise the issue of ‘survival’ both for individuals and 
nations.  
 
Such a thesis would argue that given these new realities of AOT and WMD, the self-
interest of states, like the self-interest of individuals, is a poor basis for action and 
ethics.  Indeed actions calculated in terms of short-term interests may not be realised 
as in the long-term interests of either.  The interests of survival are normative in that 
they impose requirements of action in the interests of all.  The self-interests of 
humanity cannot be calculated on the basis of the interests of each, however, but must 
involve a collective consideration.  This necessitates a conception of democracy, as 
Beitz (1979: 58) puts it, which expresses a “moral point of view”: 
 
The moral point of view requires us to regard the world from the 
perspective of one person among many rather than from that of a 
particular self with particular interests, and to choose courses of action, 
policies, rules, and institutions on grounds that would be acceptable to 
any agent who was impartial among the competing interests involved…. 
From the moral point of view…one views one’s interests as one set of 
interests among many and weighs the entire range of interests according 
to some impartial scheme. 
 
This principle of democracy is non-foundational but universal. By this is meant that it 
is not based upon any fixed conception of human nature, or of a premise, as with 
Habermas, of universal rationality, but rather purely on a principle of a mutual interest 
in universal survival. In an age of terrorism democracy is the condition upon which 
survival can best be assured. Such a conception is universal to the extent that it is 
willed. The inspiration is Nietzschean rather than Kantian. It is also quite possibly 
Foucauldian in the sense that it constitutes a universalism of democracy as a 
contingent discourse of open protection and facilitation in a world of dangers2. 
 
Although survival may justify democracy, as an end or goal it is too thin to be fully 
adequate, of course, for mere survival can not possibly satisfy a complete account of 
life’s ends and aims. And it may not be universally agreed to, if we mean by universal 
‘agreed to by all’, for there are no doubt some, including ‘suicide bombers’, for whom 
it holds no sway at all. Ultimately, that is the choice of course, and certainly it focuses 
the concentration. For if democracy is the precondition of survival, then it requires a 
democratic mandate to be effective, even so. 
 
Beyond this, it is possible to build a much richer conception of democracy on this 
basis. If survival is a final justification, and focuses our attention as to why democracy 
is important, survival with dignity resonates of a more traditional concern with ends. 
This of course is the classic conception of democracy as a doctrine based on the 
ultimate worth and dignity of the human being, as espoused in the republican 
tradition. Thus, it is not the narrow ‘realist’ theory of democracy that has been 
articulated and advocated by post-war American political science, commonly 
associated with the writings of Joseph Schumpeter’s (1976) Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, which refers to a narrow system of representative government and a 
means of changing governments through a system of elections (Hindess, 2000). 
Rather, if safety, dignity, and survival are to be possible, it must be deepened, once 
again, to refer to a substantive ends which is something more than mere utility, but 
encompasses the well-being and safety ‘of each and all’ (Shapiro, 1999). Such a 
conception must once again entail a certain idea of participation and equality as well. 
While, some philosophers and political theorists will sense a resonance here with 
Rousseau’s general will, this would be mistaken, for the model suggested here is not a 
totalising one, which presupposes unity between individual and collective, but a 
detotalising one that is based on the notion of general well being while recognising 
                                                          
2 My view is that ‘survival’ is a better basis to justify democracy than ‘social contract’. However, it is 
not possible to explore the differences in this paper. 
the diversity and differences  between cultures and people.  In terms of social 
ontology such a conception can be thought of as similar to Martha Nussbaum’s (1995: 
456) “thick vague conception of the good”. Nussbaum advances “a soft version of 
Aristotelian essentialism” (p. 450) which incorporates a “determinate account of the 
human being, human functioning and human flourishing” (p. 450). While in formal 
terms it recognises that all individuals and cultures have certain developmental and 
lifestyle needs, this “internal essentialism” (p. 451) is “an historically grounded 
empirical essentialism” (p. 451). As such, it is purely formal, for within this broad 
end, and subject to the limits necessary for its realisation and continuance, it permits 
and recognises a multitude of identities and projects and ways of life. 
 
Of course, in that Nussbaum claims to be influenced by Aristotle, there is a clear 
difference with Foucault, who was more influenced by Nietzsche. Thus Foucault 
would reject the essentialist teleological conception of the subject as ‘realising’ their 
ends or destiny, in preference for a more Nietzschean emphasis on ‘self creation’. But 
beyond this, it can be claimed that self-creation presupposes certain ‘capabilities’ in 
the way Nussbaum claims. Also, the models of social relations, and specifically of the 
ontological priority of the social to the individual are similar in both traditions. It 
should also be noted that Nussbaum has been challenged on her dependence on 
Aristotle (see Arneson, 2000; Mulgan, 2000). In her defence of locating herself in an 
Aristotelian tradition, she maintains that she is inspired by the basic ontological 
postulates, but not the detailed arguments, of Aristotle, and she admits that her 
identification as ‘Aristotelian’ has a great deal to do with her own biography and early 
philosophical commitments and training. (See Nussbaum, 2000b) 
 
In Nussbaum’s conception, such a conception of the good is concerned “with the 
overall shape and content of the human form of life” (p. 456). Such a conception, she 
says, is “vague, and this is deliberately so…for it admits of much multiple 
specification in accordance with varied local and personal conceptions. The idea is 
that it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong” (p. 456). Such a conception 
is not metaphysical in that it does not claim to derive from a source exterior to human 
beings in history. Rather, it is as “universal as possible” and aims at “mapping out the 
general shape of the human form of life, those features that constitute life as human 
wherever it is” (p. 457). Nussbaum calls this her “thick, vague conception…of the 
human form of life” (p. 457). Hence, her list of factors constitutes a formal list 
without substantive content, allowing for difference or variation within each category. 
Amongst the factors are (1) mortality: all human beings face death; (2) various 
invariant features of the human body, such as “nutritional, and other related 
requirements” regarding hunger, thirst, the need for food and drink and shelter; (3) 
cognitive: “all human beings have sense perception…the ability to think”; (4) early 
development, (5) practical reason, (6) sexual desire, (7) affiliation with other human 
beings, and (8) relatedness to other species and to nature (pp. 457-460). 
 
As a list of purely formal factors or generic species characteristics, which can admit to 
cultural and historical variation, Foucault, in my view, could agree with the general 
tenor of Nussbaum’s list, although he may wish to enter qualifications or caveats on 
specific features (sexual desire?). Foucault himself says that universal forms may well 
exist. In ‘What is Enlightenment’ (Foucault, 1984a: 47-48) he suggests there may 
possibly be universalizing tendencies at the root of western civilization, which include 
such things as “the acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom”, as 
“permanent elements”. Again, more directly, in the Preface to the History of 
Sexuality, Volume II (Foucault, 1984b: 335), he says that he is not denying the 
possibility of universal structures: 
 
Singular forms of experience may very well harbour universal structures: they 
may well not be independent from the concrete determination of social 
existence…(t)his thought has a historicity which is proper to it. That it should 
have this historicity does not mean that it is deprived of all universal form but 
instead the putting into play of these universal forms is itself historical. 
 
Like Nussbaum, the factors he recognises as invariant do not derive from any 
“extrahistorical metaphysical conception” (p. 460). Also, Foucault’s conception is 
very much in keeping with Nussbaum’s “thick, vague conception of the good” (p. 
456) in that it is concerned to identify “components that are fundamental to any 
human life” (p. 461) Of course, the recognised features of human life should be seen 
as largely formal rather than substantive, for Foucault would be skeptical that the 
essential substantial properties of a human being can be distinguished from the 
accidental properties, in that the human being is historically constituted in the process 
of history. 
 
 
                                                          
iFoucault acknowledges a debt in his use of style to Peter Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity 
(Boston, Harvard University Press, 1978). See Foucault (1989s: 320). 
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